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Abstract: Colloquial arguments for fish feeling pain are deeply rooted in anthropometric
tendencies that confuse escape responses to noxious stimuli with evidence for
consciousness. More developed arguments often rely on just-so stories of fish displaying
complex behaviours as proof of consciousness. In response to commentaries on the idea
that fish do not feel pain, I raise the need to go beyond just-so stories and to rigorously
analyse the neural circuitry responsible for specific behaviours using new and emerging
technologies in neuroscience. By deciphering the causal relationship between neural
information processing and conscious behaviour, it should be possible to assess cogently
the likelihood of whether a vertebrate species has the neural hardware necessary to —
at least — support the feeling of pain.
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Just-so stories
In this response to commentaries on the target article “Fish do not feel pain” (Key), I do
not plan to interrogate either the putative behavioural evidence or the just-so stories
previously proposed as supportive of fish feeling pain (Balcombe; Braithwaite &
Droege; Broom; Brown; Dinets; Ng). These claims have been adequately addressed
and refuted in recent literature (Key, 2015a and 2015b; Rose et al., 2014). It is timely to
be reminded of how just-so stories — like those suggesting that it is “obvious” that pain
is evolutionary important for all vertebrates (Brown) or shared by many animals
(Mather), and that active animals need a “certain level of pain” to survive (Broom) —
can easily bias hypotheses and lead to scientists “fooling themselves” (Nuzzo, 2015).
Balcombe’s just-so story about how he can easily “imagine a Tigerfish thinking of
swallows as they prepare their next hunting foray” is not helpful to the debate. I intend
to move forward and concentrate on the central issue proposed in my paper: that the
structure of neural circuits determines the types of computations executed by these
circuits and hence the behavioural outcomes. In doing so, I hope to provide a framework
for the design of new experiments that more rigorously test hypotheses regarding fish
and pain.
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What my argument was not
Some commentators incorrectly rearticulated my argument to suggest that any animal
without a human cortex can neither exhibit complex behaviour nor feel pain
(Balcombe; Braithwaite & Droege; Brown; Dinets; Haikonen; Jones; Manzotti;
Mather; Ng; Striedter). This new and simplified version of my thesis was then
subjected to interrogation by the laws of logic (Jones) as well as by “common sense”
(Balcombe). It was supposedly debunked by analogies, such as jet aeroplanes can fly
without propellers (Ng); and crickets must be deaf because they don’t have human ears
(Dinets). It was supposedly also invalidated by decades of behavioural research
demonstrating complex behaviours by many animals, including fish and birds, which
lack cortices (Balcombe; Brown; Seth). One commentator proclaimed my approach
was a mere fallacy (Haikonen).
However, my thesis was never this simple. I clearly sought to define the neural
substrates (both anatomical and physiological) that are prerequisites for the feeling of
pain in humans. At no time did I say that either these structures or physiological
processes were sufficient for pain, and present only in humans. It seems that the field
was unprepared for the use of humans as a model system to inform on function in other
animals. Interestingly, Mather warned against relying on what humans report when
studying humans.
Seth claimed that my thesis was “easily challenged by a wealth of evidence from nonmammalian species like birds.” This evidence related to the complex behaviour
displayed by these animals. While this statement, by itself, is not very compelling, it does
relate to points raised by other commentators who suggested that birds may possess
cortex-like neural architecture (Brown; Striedter; Dinets). Even though these
commentators didn’t realise it, this is the very point I was arguing for in my paper. I did
clearly articulate “only vertebrate nervous systems possessing all of the following
neuroanatomical features are capable of feeling pain.” I proposed that within
vertebrates, only those animals with such features are capable — at least — of feeling
pain (i.e., those features are necessary but not sufficient). I have also raised this point in
another recent article (Key, 2015a) and indicated, very succinctly, that birds appear to
possess some of these prerequisite neural properties (even though they do not possess a
cortex).
Evidence from mammalian and avian brains supports the structure-function
principle
Previous evidence has revealed similarities in the laminar organization of the
mammalian cortex and the gross organization of nuclei in the avian auditory pallium
(Karten, 2013). This anatomical data is now being supplemented by physiological
studies that support the basic premise of my structure-function argument as described
in the target article.
During primate and mouse vocalisations, there is motor cortex feedforward input (called
corollary discharge) that suppresses the auditory cortex (Eliades and Wang, 2008;
Nelson et al., 2013; Schneider et al., 2014). This motor-elicited suppression involves a
circuit consisting of excitatory motor cortical projection neurons terminating on
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inhibitory interneurons in the auditory cortex. This neural mechanism seems to be very
important in self-monitoring, vocal learning and distinguishing self from externally
produced auditory inputs (Schneider and Mooney, 2015). Interestingly, songbirds have
motor pallial projection neurons that also carry corollary discharge to the auditory
pallium and this activity is involved in vocal learning. Thus, primates, mice and
songbirds possess similar basic local and long-range circuitry in the auditory cortex and
auditory pallium, and they share similar functional properties involved in specific
hearing behaviours.
Recently, the basic premise of the structure-function relationship was examined at the
level of canonical microcircuits in the avian auditory pallium (Calabrese and Woolley,
2015). Birds demonstrated hierarchical information processing, response features and
population coding in the auditory pallium similar to that previously described in
mammalian auditory cortex in response to auditory stimuli. These results support the
idea that structurally analogous microcircuits perform similar high-level functions
across these vertebrate species. Of course these structure-function relationships do not
address whether the songbirds are consciously aware of their vocalisations. More
detailed analyses obviously need to be completed in order to begin to understand
whether such brain regions also support global integration and signal amplification
underlying phenomenal consciousness. Nonetheless, these studies are providing
positive signs that similar neural architectures can be used to predict analogous
physiological functions and most likely high-level brain behaviours within the
vertebrate lineage.
Other-brain-regions argument
A common dismissive approach to my argument was to claim that “other brain regions”
are clearly able to produce the sensation of pain in fish. This proposition arises from the
idea that throughout the animal kingdom many different anatomical structures seem to
perform similar physiological functions. However, the anecdotes presented were
typically simple and lacked critical insight. For instance, Manzotti noted that bats can fly
without feathers. My response to such an analogy is that one needs to understand how
feathers enable flight (e.g., what are their aerodynamical properties and how are they
structurally arranged to produce flight). In this case, it is important to note that different
feather structures as well as their particular arrangement can produce different flight
behaviours in birds (Beaufrère, 2009; Xu et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015). Moreover, birds
and bats exhibit very different flying behaviours because of their different anatomies
(Hedenström et al., 2007; Hedenström and Johansson, 2015). Once the fundamental
aerodynamical principles of feathered flight have been characterised (just as I defined
the fundamental neural principles in human pain), then one could search for their
structural basis in other species (e.g., bats). That is, do bats have similar anatomical
structures that permit feathered flight or do they produce a very different type of flight
because of anatomical differences? What proponents of the “other brain regions”
argument fail to do is to progress their reasoning to a mechanistic level (both anatomical
and physiological). Rather than understand how other brain regions could, or could not,
lead to pain, they instead superficially treat these structures as “black boxes.”
Striedter argues that homologous brain regions can perform different functions in
different species. He cites the observation that fish can swim in the absence of the
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telencephalon, but primates with motor cortex lesions are paralyzed. By inference, lower
brain regions produce locomotion in fish, but not in humans, so perhaps fish can also
feel pain within these regions. Once again it is imperative to interrogate the underlying
neural architecture and circuitry in order to address this matter. Rhythmical locomotion
in vertebrates depends on central pattern generators (Marder and Bucher, 2001; Jung
and Dasen, 2015). Some of these generators are present in the brainstem and spinal
cord, and their control is regulated to varying extents by higher-level circuitry in
different species. The distinct body postures adopted by humans with lesions in
different brain regions reveals that hierarchical control mechanisms modulate the spinal
cord central pattern generators (Schepelmann, 1979). Nonetheless, the basic structure
and function of these central pattern generators remain very similar across vertebrate
species. For instance, when either a spinal dog or cat is placed in a harness to support
their body weight, these pattern generators can be activated to generate locomotor
behaviours. To conclude, as Striedter does, that fish lower brain regions and spinal
cords are doing something remarkably different is merely misunderstanding the
underlying anatomy. Once again, critical insight is gained by examining the neural
structures in detail (as I argued in the target article). In fact, the cortical control of motor
activity raised by Striedter is more consistent with the argument that the cortex has
specialised neural functions.
Rather than discuss the validity of my proposed anatomical and physiological
prerequisites for pain, some commentators instead proposed that pain is such an
important behaviour that it must be central to both the evolution of all vertebrates
(Brown) and to the “flexible and adaptive behaviour” demonstrated by fish (Seth).
Consequently, these just-so stories can lead to the conclusion that pain must have
evolved early in the vertebrate lineage, and must be localised to an anatomical structure
present in most, if not all, vertebrates. The phylogenetically old brainstem (Ng) and/or
the midbrain tectum (Striedter) were presented as possible brain regions. Seth also
suggested that fish pain was occurring in some “phylogenetically ancient brain region”
with “alternate neuronal architectures.” It is interesting that none of the commentators
actually proposed what those alternate neural circuits could be in these ancient brain
regions. One commentator went as far as to suggest that neural processes do not
underlie pain (Manzotti). It needs to be pointed out that Braithwaite & Droege did
acknowledge that both global integration and attentional amplification are “essential
elements in consciousness” as I argued. Unfortunately, they then automatically assumed
that the fish brain must possess the necessary neural architecture to execute these
functions.
Preoccupation with complex behaviours
Some commentators argued that complex behaviours demonstrated by animals is clear
evidence, in itself, of animal consciousness and hence their ability to feel pain. Many of
these behaviours are presented as just-so stories, for example: the big grouper cleaning
stations (Dinets), fish learning about food sources (Broom), tool use (Seth), birdhunting fish (Balcombe), nausea-causing taste aversion in goldfish (Striedter), and
zebrafish learning from fear (Broom). Braithwaite & Droege have called for more
behavioural measures to be used in order to further demonstrate conscious pain in fish.
However, they mistakenly claim that I also advocate better tests (such as those involving
the loss of normal behaviour) as evidence of pain. Unfortunately, my argument was
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misinterpreted. What I actually demonstrated was that if such an approach were
adopted (e.g., operations on fish involving craniotomy), it would be found insufficient. I
also argued that some seemingly complex behaviours can be executed without the need
of pain for motivation. One example I highlighted was the ability of a rodent spinal
preparation to control leg position so as to prevent getting an electric shock.
In his commentary, Hart raised the idea that there is a strong belief by some biologists
that complex behaviour automatically implies consciousness. He suggested that this idea
emerged from the subjective experience that consciousness seems to be central to
human complex behaviours. Typically these complex behaviours are considered to be
goal-directed and flexible (i.e., ability to modify behaviour in novel circumstances;
Waskom et al., 2014). Since goal-directed behaviour is usually thought to involve the
conscious appreciation of the relationship between a stimulus, a response (or action)
and an outcome (Wokke et al., 2011; Zwosta et al., 2015), it becomes clear why fish
behaviourists emphasise the ability of fish to perform complex behaviours as evidence
for fish consciousness. Moreover, in many cases pursuing goals also seems tightly
associated with being aware of (i.e., to feel) rewards and/or punishments (Dijksterhuis
and Aarts, 2010). Consequently, questioning the idea that fish feel pain seems to be
interpreted by some behaviourists as an attack on the ability of fish to perform complex
behaviours. Breaking the link between goal pursuit and consciousness (Williams et al.,
2009; Wokke et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2012; de Pisapia, 2013; Tamir et al., 2013;
Huang and Bargh, 2014) may lead to a new way of thinking about fish behaviour. In this
respect, I would like to highlight recent research that is probing how some human
behaviours, such as the placebo and nocebo effects as well as pain conditioning (which
were previously considered to be dependent on conscious will or awareness) can be
explained by nonconscious processes. These studies are clearly revealing that the link
between the execution of complex behaviour and conscious expectancies or feelings is
not necessary to explain outcomes (Jensen et al., 2012, 2015a and 2015b).
Chella introduces a new line of experimental evidence that questions the need for
conscious neural processing in fish behaviour. He discusses how robotic fish can
perform complex behaviours based on automatic stimulus-response processing without
cognitive architectures. However, he does carefully acknowledge that robotic fish are
not real fish and what this research is showing, at least, is that adding the capacity of
feeling to robotic fish may not change their behavioural repertoire. Nonetheless,
robotics is an exciting area of research and recent advances in the autonomous
behaviour of mobile animal-like robots (Bazeille et al., 2014) may in the future provide
some novel insights into the types of neural processing required for complex animal
behaviours. It is also important to highlight complementary research aimed at
generating computational models of the human brain (Eliasmith et al., 2012; Rasmussen
and Eliasmith, 2013). Such models are able to perform complex tasks involving memory,
visual perception and reasoning and are built on the principles of brain-like neural
information processing. If we assume that these stimulations are not conscious, then the
mandatory link between awareness and complex behaviour dissolves.
The way forward
In addition to changing the way we think about associating consciousness and complex
behaviours, it is imperative that the practice of representing brain regions as mysterious
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black boxes is abandoned. I proposed that structure determines function and that this is
applicable to the level of neural circuits controlling behaviours. Many commentators
proposed (without evidence) that different structures (i.e., brain regions) can perform
the same function. That is, the brainstem in fish can do what the cortex does in
mammals. The field needs to move forward and go beyond this black-box approach to
brain function and, at least, attempt to define the nature of the circuitry within the
brainstem that is executing the computations proposed to be responsible for the feeling
of pain. It is not enough to merely claim via analogy that “propellers” and “jet engines”
do the same thing (Ng). If we persevere with the same analogy: where is, and what is, the
“propeller” in the brainstem and how is it achieving the same function as the “jet engine”
in the cortex.
The present and next generation of fish behaviourists must be encouraged to embrace
state-of-the-art neural recording and imaging approaches and molecular genetic
manipulations that are allowing the dissection of the neural circuits responsible for
mammalian behaviours (Choi et al., 2011; Franks et al., 2011; Gaykema et al., 2014; Land
et al., 2014; Betley et al., 2015; Graebner et al., 2015; Vardy et al., 2015). It is an
opportune time to combine electrophysiological and advanced microscopy techniques
with neural circuit manipulation and mapping approaches to establish the causal link
between neural activity and specific behaviours. Such strategies should cast light on
what neural architectures underlie awareness and could possibly lead to novel ways of
directly altering circuit function (Krug et al., 2015; Saunders et al., 2015) so as to
modulate pain.
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